Case Law Update – Washington

A reasonable denial of coverage.  Based on the weight of legal authority, insurers might wonder if such a thing even exists in Washington.  A new decision from the Western District of Washington demonstrates that insurers will not always find themselves in peril after a denial.  In Trofimovich v. Progressive Direct Insurance Company, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125328 (W.D. Wa.), Honorable John Coughenour ruled that Progressive’s denial of an auto physical damage claim based on an exclusion for operation of the vehicle for hire was reasonable.  The Court dismissed all contractual and extra-contractual causes of action based on that finding.

Trofimovich involved an accident occurring on June 17, 2016.  After the accident, the insured contacted Progressive and gave a recorded statement.  During that statement, the insured stated that he was working for Lyft, a ride share company, and that he had a passenger at the time of the accident.  The insured further declined Progressive’s offer to arrange towing services based on his belief that Lyft would provide a tow.

The next day, the insured gave a second statement.  In this statement, the insured indicated that the passenger in his vehicle at the time of the loss was not a paying customer.  He claimed that he had given that passenger a ride earlier in the day, but that the ride at issue was being given for free due to a financial hardship on the part of the passenger.

On June 30, 2016, Progressive issued a letter denying coverage based on an exclusion that precluded coverage for damage occurring while operating the vehicle to transport passengers for a fee.

In July, the insured retained counsel, who issued an Insurance Fair Conduct Act Notice alleging that the denial was in violation of the statute.  On July 29, 2016, without amending its coverage position, Progressive agreed to pay the claim.  On August 26, 2016, the insured filed suit alleging breach of contract, bad faith, and violations of IFCA and the Washington Consumer Protection Act.

On Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment on all causes of action, the Court ruled that Progressive’s interpretation of the insured’s initial statement was reasonable.  The Court further held as follows:
Progressive made the choice to reject one of two apparently conflicting statements, something that cannot be uncommon in claims adjusting. This alone does not render Progressive’s denial unreasonable. . .
Thus, the Court concludes as a matter of law that Progressive’s initial denial of coverage was reasonable.

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125328 at 7-8.

Based on this finding, the Court proceeded to grant Summary Judgment in favor of Progressive dismissing the insured’s causes of action for breach of contract, bad faith, violation of the Consumer Protection Act, and violation of the Washington Insurance Fair Conduct Act.

The Court’s decision in Trofimovich demonstrates that insurers can secure good results in Washington when they play by the rules and act reasonably, basing their decisions on sound reasoning and a straight-forward assessment of the facts.

Lether & Associates proudly represented Progressive in the Trofimovichcase.  A copy of the decision is attached.  If you would like to discuss the case, or any other matter, in further detail, please feel free to contact us at any time.

Oregon Supreme Court Expands Availability of Attorney Fee Awards under ORS 742.061

Oregon Supreme Court Expands Availability of Attorney Fee Awards under ORS 742.061

For years, Oregon’s primary legislative device for compelling prompt settlement of insurance claims has been the availability of an attorney fee award for insureds who recover more than the amount tendered by an insurer within six months of the proof of loss in a lawsuit seeking coverage under ORS 742.061. Prior to the decision in Long v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Oregon, 360 Or 791 (2017), most believed that an insured had to actually obtain a judgment awarding monetary damages in the suit seeking coverage to be entitled attorney fees. However, in Long, the Oregon Supreme Court identified a new way that an insured can obtain an attorney fee award under ORS 742.061, which can apply even if the insured does not prevail in the suit seeking additional coverage.

In Long, the insured submitted a claim under a homeowner’s policy due to a water leak. Farmers promptly paid about $3,000 to the insured for the actual cash value of the claim. Shortly thereafter, the insured submitted estimates indicating that his ACV claim was worth more than $3,000. However, no further payments were made at that time.

About two years later, the insured filed suit against Farmers seeking additional ACV coverage. Farmers subsequently issued two voluntary ACV claim payments following a court-ordered appraisal. On the eve of trial, the insured submitted a proof of loss for his replacement cost claims. Farmers adjusted and paid the RCV claim three days later.

The verdict rendered by the court after trial found that the insured was owed less for his claim than what he received from Farmers before the suit was filed. Accordingly, judgment in favor of Farmers was entered. Nevertheless, the insured filed a petition seeking an award of attorney fees under ORS 742.061. In that petition, the insured argued that he was entitled to an attorney fee award because he “recovered” more than was timely tendered by Farmers based on the voluntary payments issued after the suit was filed. The trial court denied the insured’s petition because it believed that the insured had to obtain a judgment awarding monetary damages to be entitled to attorney fees under ORS 742.061.

On review, the Oregon Supreme Court decided that the “recovery” which must exceed the amount of any timely tenders made by an insurer does not need to be based on a judgment entered in favor of the insured. Accordingly, the Court held that voluntary payments given during litigation can qualify as a “recovery” which triggers entitlement to an attorney fee award under ORS 742.061.

In this case, the Court held that the insured was entitled to an attorney fee award for the work performed by his attorneys up until the time he received the additional ACV claim payments. However, the Court also ruled that the insured was not entitled to any further attorney fees because Farmers paid the RCV claim just days after that claim was submitted and the insured did not recover any more at trial than was timely tendered by Farmers.

The Long case reiterates the importance of determining and paying the full value of a claim within six months of the claim submission because it establishes that subsequent claim payments made during litigation will result in at least some attorney fee exposure. See also Jones v. Nava, 264 Or App 235, 240-241 (2014) (confirming that tenders must be made within six months of proof of loss to avoid attorney fee exposure, even if untimely tender exceeding ultimate recovery is given prior to filing of action). However, the decision is not completely adverse to insurers because it also confirms that the requirements for an attorney fee award must be separately met for each claim submitted, even if claims arise from the same loss.

If you have any questions about this case or how it may affect any of your pending or future claims, do not hesitate to contact our office.

Washington Supreme Court Addresses the Insurance Fair Conduct Act

Washington Supreme Court Addresses the Insurance Fair Conduct Act

Perez-Crisantos v. State Farm et al., Wash. Sup. Ct., No. 92267-5, (February 2, 2017), is perhaps the most favorable ruling for insurers from the Washington Supreme Court in the past several years. The Perez-Crisantos Court was asked to decide whether, in the absence of an unreasonable denial of coverage or benefits, the Insurance Fair Conduct Act (IFCA) creates an independent and private cause of action for an alleged violation of Washington’s Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Regulations. Definitively, the Court held that it does not.

In Perez-Crisantos, the insured was involved in car accident and sustained injuries. The insured was not at-fault and ultimately settled with the at-fault party’s insurance carrier for its policy limits. The insured then tendered a claim for underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits to his insurance carrier, State Farm. State Farm paid its personal injury protection (PIP) limit of $10,000 in medical benefits and $400 in lost wages, but did not pay benefits under the UIM policy, taking the position that the insured had already been made whole. Arguing that State Farm unreasonably denied benefits, the insured sued State Farm alleging violations of IFCA, the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), chapter 19.86 RCW, bad faith and negligence. This lawsuit was stayed while the UIM claim was sent to arbitration.

The arbitrator found that the insured’s damages from the accident totaled $51,000. After adjusting for settlement with the at-fault party, PIP payments, and attorneys’ fees, the insured received $24,000 of new money from State Farm. The stay in the bad faith lawsuit was then lifted. State Farm moved for summary judgment arguing that it had acted reasonably and that the parties had simply had a reasonable disagreement about the value of the claim. The insured moved for partial-summary judgment arguing that State Farm had violated WAC 284-30-330(7)’s prohibition of forcing first party claimants to litigation to recover “amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered in such actions.” The Spokane County Superior Court ruled in State Farm’s favor, finding no evidence that State Farm’s actions were unreasonable, and dismissed the case with prejudice.

The insured appealed directly to the Washington Supreme Court, seeking a determination as to whether IFCA creates an independent and private cause of action for an insurer’s technical violation of the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Regulations in the absence of an unreasonable denial of coverage or benefits.

Like many of the federal courts before it, the Washington Supreme Court struggled with the interplay of paragraphs 2, 3, and 5 of the statute, and ultimately found that the statute was ambiguous. The Court further admitted that the result of an isolated regulatory violation was not clear.

[G]iven that the trier of fact must find that an insurer acted unreasonably under subsection (1), and that such a finding mandates attorneys’ fees under subsection (3) and gives the trial court discretion to award treble damages under subsection (2), it is not clear what a finding of a regulatory violation accomplishes. (emphasis added).

. . .

IFCA explicitly creates a cause of action for first party insureds who were “unreasonably denied a claim for coverage or payment of benefits.” IFCA does not state it creates a cause of action for first party insureds who were unreasonably denied a claim for coverage or payment of benefits or “whose claims were processed in violation of the insurance regulations listed in (5),” which strongly suggests that IFCA was not meant to create a cause of action for regulatory violations.” (Internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

In finding IFCA ambiguous, the Court then analyzed IFCA’s official ballot title and determined that it was not the legislature’s intent to create a private cause of action for mere technical violations.

This language does not suggest an intent to create a private cause of action for regulatory violations. Quite the opposite: it suggests that IFCA creates a case of action for unreasonable denials of coverage and also permits treble damages in some circumstances. On balance, we conclude that the legislative history suggests that IFCA does not create a cause of action for regulatory violations. (emphasis added).

The Washington Supreme Court then advised that Washington’s current pattern jury instruction on IFCA is a misstatement of the law. The current pattern instruction concludes that IFCA creates a cause of action if an insurer “unreasonably denied a claim for coverage” or “unreasonably denied payment of benefits,” or “violated a statute or regulation governing the business of insurance claims handling.” Based on the foregoing, this instruction is clearly incorrect.

The Perez-Crisantos decision is a rare win for insurers in what has become a very difficult jurisdiction. This decision should prove extremely important as IFCA claims, and IFCA claims premised solely on technical violations of Washington’s insurance regulations, are becoming more and more prominent. To the extent that you have detailed questions about this case or how it may affect any of your pending or future claims or litigation, do not hesitate to contact our office.

Crowthers v. Travelers: The Federal Court Gets It Right Again on IFCA

Crowthers v. Travelers: The Federal Court Gets It Right Again on IFCA

The Washington State Insurance Fair Conduct Act, commonly referred to as “IFCA”, continues to cause significant concern among insurers conducting business in the State of Washington. The lack of any decisions from the Washington State Appellate Courts interpreting or applying the statute has further compounded the uncertainty relating to IFCA.

The Federal Courts, however, have continued to issue rulings on the application of IFCA in a number of scenarios. The trend of these decisions indicates that the Federal Courts are obtaining a better grasp on how IFCA is to be applied. These decisions provide better direction to all insurers and insureds in regard to these claims.

The most recent decision from the Federal Courts is Crowthers v. The Travelers Indemnity Company, United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, 2:16-cv-00606-RSL. In Crowthers, the Honorable Robert S. Lasnik again held that a technical violation of a regulatory provision under the Washington Administrative does not necessarily constitute an IFCA violation. In issuing this holding, the Court referenced the same result reached by Judge Robart in Schreib v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118189 (W.D. Wa.). As a result, it appears that the trend in at least the Western District is that an IFCA violation requires an actual unreasonable denial benefits or of coverage, and not simply a technical violation of the regulations.

Judge Lasnik then went on to address the fact that the Plaintiff in the Crowthers case had failed to establish any “actual damages” under IFCA, as well as a lack of any damage claims asserted as to the remaining extra-contractual claims asserted by Plaintiff. The Court held that a failure to establish actual damages as to these extra-contractual causes of action also warranted dismissal of the claims on a summary judgment motion. This decision again underscores the fact that in order to prosecute an IFCA claim, a party must prove actual damages or injuries. This ruling is again consistent with the ruling in Schreib.

The Crowthers case provides excellent legal precedent for insurers to utilize in defending IFCA claims. In fact, at least one court in King County, Washington (Seattle) utilized the Crowthers decision in dismissing an IFCA claim in a separate, highly contested consent judgment case arising from an underlying commercial construction defect matter.

Lether & Associates proudly represented Travelers in the Crowthers matter. If you have any questions in regard to this case, please let us know. In the meantime, a copy of this decision is attached.

On a different note, Lether & Associates is proud to add three new attorneys to the office. Congratulations to Nicole Morrow, Matt Erickson and Ben Miller. Each of our new rising stars brings a great attitude and experience to our team. This includes adjusting experience and defense experience. Our recent growth also means we have added an attorney licensed in the State of California to better service our California client base. Welcome aboard, everyone.

Recent Oregon Supreme Court Decision

Yesterday, the Oregon Supreme Court issued a decision clarifying the statute of limitation for negligent construction claims. In Goodwin v. Kingsmen Plastering Inc., 359 Or. 694 (June 16, 2016), the Court was asked to identify the period of limitations for a negligent construction claim. Plaintiffs in the case filed a claim for negligence and negligence per se, alleging construction defects that led to water intrusion at a single family residence built in 2001.  Plaintiffs argued that the six-year statute of limitation set forth in ORS 12.080(3), which applies to actions “for interference with or injury to any interest of another real property,” governed their claims.

Defendant, a siding subcontractor, argued that the action was not for injury to an “interest” in real property, but rather for damage to the property itself, and should be governed by a two-year statute of limitations set for in ORS 12.110(1). That statute applies to tort actions in general.

The Oregon Supreme Court determined conclusively that the two-year statute of limitations set forth in ORS 12.110(1) applied. The Court found that ORS 12.080(3) applied only to an injury to an “interest” in real property, such as trespass or waste. It did not apply to actions arising from damage to the property itself. The Court further held that the Plaintiff’s discovery of the damage to the property initiates the two year period of limitation. As a result, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for determination of whether or not the action was brought within two years of when the Plaintiffs knew or should have known about the damage.

This case provides clarity as to the appropriate statute of limitations in Oregon for negligent construction claims. Previously there had been some confusion over what statute should apply. The arguments presented in theGoodwin case were common. Parties often argued whether the six-year or two-year period was appropriate for actions involving construction defects. The Court has now clarified that a party has two years from which to bring a claim for negligent construction. Moreover, the Court clarified that this two-year period of limitations allows for discovery of the claim. As a result, the operative date for any statute of limitations defense will be when the claimant knew or should have known about the damage to the property.

Lether & Associates regularly represents insurers in a number of construction matters and other insurance claims in the State of Oregon.  This includes some of the most significant construction defect claims in that jurisdiction.  A number of our attorneys are licensed to practice in Oregon.  We are always happy to discuss representation of clients in that jurisdiction.